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As one of the world’s most famous online social networks (OSN), Twitter 
now has 320 million monthly active users. Accompanying the large user group 
and abundant personal information, users increasingly realize the vulnerability 
of tweets and have reservations of showing certain tweets to different follower 
groups, such as colleagues, friends and other followers. However, Twitter does 
not offer enough privacy protection or access control functions. Users can just 
set an account as protected, which results in only the user’s followers seeing 
the tweet. The protected tweet does not appear in the public domain, third party 
sites and search engines cannot access the tweet. However, a protected 
account cannot distinguish between different follower groups or users who use 
multiple accounts. To serve the demand of the user so that they can restrict the 
access of each tweet to certain follower groups, we propose a browser plug-in 
system, which utilizes CP-ABE (Ciphertext Policy Attribute based encryption), 
allowing the user to select followers based on predefined attributes. Through 
simple installation and pre-setting, the user can encrypt and decrypt tweets 
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Introduction and Motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
 
Communication through a social forum i.e. the internet has evolved 
exponentially with the introduction of Online Social Networking Sites 
(OSN).The rapid increase in OSN has resulted in the people communicating 
and sharing information with other people through OSN rather than face to face 
communication. As of January 2014, 74% of the internet users use social 
networking sites [1]. This has increased over the years since it was just 8% of 
the users as of February 2005 [1].Twitter is one such OSN. Twitter estimates 
its monthly active users to be close to 310 million. As of September 2014 it is 
estimated that 23% of the adult population uses Twitter. Twitter poses a unique 
bottleneck to user in terms of a security perspective. Unlike other OSN such as 
Facebook any tweet (information) posted by the user is accessible to all other 
users. This prevents the user from sharing private information or puts user at 
risk of unwanted followers of his account being privy to information that was 
originally not intended for them. The user does have an option of sending this 
information in the form of private message via Twitter, this however would be a 
very tedious process in which the user every time has to manually select the 
user group to whom he or she wishes to share the information with Figure 1.1 
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is an example of data and communication over Twitter. Figure 1.1 is an 
example of a tweet message that a user (Alice) broadcasts over to the public.  
 
 
    Figure 1.1.  Twitter - Tweet Example 
 
Figure 1.2 shows how a private tweet created by Alice which was originally 
intended for her friend Cathy but is now accessible to someone who is 
viewing her Twitter account.  
 
 
       Figure 1.2. Twitter – Tweet public example 
 
Figure 1.3 illustrates a private message posted by Alice to Bob. In this 
example the private key is what Alice has shared with Bob; we will talk more 
about this later. Observe that every time the user has a new target group in 
mind he has to manually add all the users who will be privy to that information 
i.e. every time Alice wishes to share something with a bunch of users apart 
from Bob where the information she wishes to share with each user is 













From a security standpoint it is critical that only the intended users can view 
the information tweeted by the user unless the tweet is actually intended for the 
entire public. For example, Alice a Twitter user decides to throw a college 
graduation party and posts the details of the party via a tweet. Assume that the 
tweet was originally intended for the classmates of Alice. A random stranger 
viewing Alice’s profile on Twitter can actually view this information. Depending 
on the sensitivity of the information that the user tweets the consequences can 
be extremely dire. Mining this public data from Alice also gives third parties 
more information about her which they can use to their advantage.  
 
For example if Alice is a computer scientist, and a company X who mines 
Twitter public data realizes that she is graduating from college. The company 
X is in need of computer scientists so based on the mined information from the 
tweets and additional user information they start contacting Alice as they feel 
she might be a good fit. What if Alice already has a job or is not interested in 
what company X does. Then company X contacting her can be very frustrating 
for her and a breach of her privacy. The root cause of this problem which Alice 
probably does not know is the innocent tweet she posted regarding her 
graduation party. 
 
A cryptographic based solution would be ideal for protecting information in 
a distributed setting [2]. A perfect scenario would be where the user decides 
the policy decisions that is who can or cannot see the tweets. There are two 
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issues for encryption while dealing with an OSN such as Twitter. The first is to 
restrict the information available to third party applications as precisely as  
possible, so that individual organizations are not entrusted with large volumes 
of personal information. The second issue is to restrict the information shared 
with followers who can also be considered as friends of the users to what might 
be appropriate. Any follower of the user in Twitter is considered as a friend [2]. 
These two issues as stand-alone problems are not particularly difficult to 
handle. The challenge lies in the user having the ability to share information to 
a restricted set of users on an OSN without taking the aid of any trusted third 
party application. An example of this scenario would be the ability of a user to 
tweet “called in sick to work” without telling co-workers [2].  
 
Traditionally, this type of expressive access control is enforced by 
employing a trusted server to store data locally. The server is entrusted as a 
reference monitor that checks that a user presents proper certification before 
allowing him to access records or files. However, services are increasingly 
storing data in a distributed fashion across many servers. Replicating data 
across several locations has advantages in both performance and reliability. 
The drawback of this trend is that it is increasingly difficult to guarantee the 
security of data using traditional methods; when data is stored at several 
locations, the chances that one of them has been compromised increases 
dramatically. For these reasons we would like to require that sensitive data is 
stored in an encrypted form so that it will remain private even if a server is 
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compromised [3]. To provide such functionality without any third party support 
requires some kind of cryptographic keying.    
 
The underlying idea behind this research is to come up with a simple 
application that gives the user the ability to have access based control without 
the use of any third party application. The cryptographic mechanism used here 
to achieve this is Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE). In 
traditional public key cryptography a message is encrypted for a particular 
receiver using the receiver’s public key [4].  Identity based encryption (IBE) 
went one step further by generating public key of the user based on some 
unique identifier of the user. Attribute based encryption (ABE) dove one step 
further by defining identities not as standalone identifiers but a set of attributes. 
CPABE is a variant of ABE where the public key is identified by a set of policies. 
Another challenge that was encountered was how to share the encrypted 
information on an OSN. If third parties (e.g. Hackers) know that the information 
is encrypted then the tweet might be subjected to attacks making the system 
vulnerable. The plug-in (chrome extension) was built keeping all of these issues 
































2.1 About Twitter 
 
  
Every OSN has its own convention and terminology for providing 
communication. The OSN that we deal with in this research is Twitter. Twitter 
is a popular OSN which has registered 310 million active users [1]. All user 
accounts are public by default in Twitter. Twitter is indexed with the popular 
search engine like Google, Bing, making every user is accessible to the public. 
Twitter communication is primarily through tweets - a word set that can contain 
up to 140 characters. Users can tweet about any topics, such as trending news 
or also personal information such as birthdays, anniversaries etc. There is no 
restriction on the number of tweets a user can post [5]. The user also has the 
ability to post an image or media. We have used this feature to our advantage 
while creating the extension. 
 





Twitter doesn't have a concept of Friends. "Follow" concept is followed in 
Twitter, where we just have to follow any person we want. Hence, to map the 
friends list, we used the intersection list of the followers (people whom the user 
follows) with followees (people who follow the given user) as friends list. 
 
A tweet starting with RT is called Re-Tweet. This means that the user has 
re-tweeted someone else's tweet. Most of these tweets are about the general 
events and happenings.  
 
The "@" - tag is used to tag a user. @ - followed by a user name is the 
convention used to tag a user to the message. If a user is tagged to a message 
like "Happy birthday mother", the probability of that user being a mother is high. 
Hence, we mine this @ - tag information to look for family details. We also 
ignore the @ - tag because our primary objective is to hide information and the 
@- tag would make it obvious that the user has some relation with the message 
tweeted. 
  Direct Messages are the private side of Twitter. You can use Direct 
Messages to have private conversations with Twitter users about Tweets and 
other content. You can start a private conversation or create a group 
conversation with anyone who follows you. Anyone in a conversation can send 
Direct Messages to the group. Everyone in a group can see all messages, 
even if everyone doesn’t follow each other. In group conversations, anyone in 
the conversation can add other participants. Newly added participants won’t 
see the prior history of the conversation. Some accounts, particularly 
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businesses on Twitter, have enabled a setting to receive Direct Messages from 
anyone. You can send a Direct Message to these users even if they don’t 
follow you. In both group and one-on-one conversations, you cannot be in a 
conversation with someone you block [6]. 
Twitter also has an application management system. The application 
management system generates particular key value pairs for a particular 
application. They are Consumer Key (API Key), Consumer Secret (API Secret), 
Access Token and Access Token Secret. These values are arbitrarily large 
strings that ensure that only users with these valid credentials can make API 
calls to the particular Twitter account. 
 
2.2 Preliminaries 
2.2.1 Twitter API 
In order to collect Twitter data, we used the Twitter open-source API - 
Tweepy [7]. Tweepy is a python based API that allows us to post tweets or 
private messages through Twitter.  The API class provides access to the 
entire Twitter RESTful API methods. Each method can accept various 
parameters and return responses. When we invoke an API method most of 
the time returned back to us will be a Tweepy model class instance. This will 
contain the data returned from Twitter which we can then use inside our 
application. Tweepy tries to make authentication as simple as possible. In 
order to communicate with the users account in Twitter the user needs to 
pass Consumer Key (API Key), Consumer Secret (API Secret), Access Token 
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and Access Token Secret to the OAuth handler present in Tweepy. The API 
has other simple calls to update media and download images. 
 
2.2.2 Python Image Library 
The Python Imaging Library (PIL) adds image processing capabilities to your 
Python interpreter. This library provides extensive file format support, an 
efficient internal representation, and fairly powerful image processing 
capabilities. The core image library is designed for fast access to data stored 
in a few basic pixel formats. 
 
2.2.3 Chrome Extension 
An extension is a small program that adds a new dimension to your browser 
in terms of functionality. The Google Chrome browser is the world’s most 
popular browser [8]. An extension running on the Chrome browser is a 
Chrome Extension. Chrome Extensions are written in web technologies such 
as JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Extensions have little to no user interface. 
Extensions bundle all their files into a single file that the user downloads and 
installs. This bundling means that, unlike ordinary web apps, extensions don't 
need to depend on content from the web [9]. 
 
2.2.3.1 Chrome Extension Architecture 
An Extension is a bundle of zipped files comprising of HTML, CSS, 
JavaScript, image files etc. Extensions are essentially web pages, and they 
can use all the APIs that the browser provides to web pages, from XML 
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HTTP-Request to JSON to HTML5.  Extensions can interact with web pages 
or servers using content scripts or cross-origin XMLHTTP-Requests. The 
components of the Chrome Extension we are going to deal with here are the 
manifest file, HTML, content script and background script [9]. 
 
 The manifest file, called manifest.json, gives information about the 
extension, such as the most important files and the capabilities that the 
extension might use [9].  Shown below is the manifest file that is used for the 
creation of the extension. Figure 2.1 illustrates an example of a manifest file. 
What is included in the manifest file includes the name of the extensions. 
What HTML pages and JavaScript files would the extension interact with i.e. 
these are the files which are bundled along with the extension. There are a 
set of permissions and browser action keys in the manifest which set certain 
permissions and tell the extension how to behave on loading. 
  
 Background pages defined by background.html can include JavaScript 
code that controls the behavior of the extension. There are two types of 
background pages: persistent background pages, and event pages. 
Persistent background pages are always open. Event pages are opened and 
closed as needed. Extensions can contain ordinary HTML pages that display 
the extension's UI. For example, a browser action can have a popup, which is 
implemented by an HTML file. Any extension can have an options page, 





                                
                                 Figure 2.1      Extension – Manifest File 
{ 
  // Extension ID: knldjmfmopnpolahpmmgbagdohdnhkik 
  "key": 
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDcBHwzDvyBQ6bDppkIs9MP4ksKqCMyXQ/A52JivHZKh4YO/9vJsT3oaYhSpDCE9RPocOE
QvwsHsFReW2nUEc6OLLyoCFFxIb7KkLGsmfakkut/fFdNJYh0xOTbSN8YvLWcqph09XAY2Y/f0AL7vfO1cuCqtkMt8hFrBGWxDdf9CQIDAQAB", 
  "name": "Native Messaging Example", 
  "version": "1.0", 
  "manifest_version": 2, 
  "description": "Send a message to a native application.", 
   "background": { 
    "persistent": false, 
    "scripts": ["main.js"] 
  }, 
 "browser_action": {   
 "default_title":"Encryption and Decryption", 
 "default_popup":"main.html" 
  }, 
  "permissions": [ 
    "nativeMessaging" 
  ], 
  "content_scripts":[ 
    { 
      "matches": ["https://Twitter.com/*"], 
      "js": ["jquery-2.2.3.min.js", "myscript.js"] 
    } 






Content scripts are JavaScript files that run in the context of web pages. By 
using the standard Document Object Model (DOM), they can read details of 
the web pages the browser visits, or make changes to them. The Background 
script on the other hand can only interact with the extension. Unlike the 
Content script which interacts with browser the Background script forms a 
bridge between the HTML (popup HTML) and the intended action of the 
extension. 
                           
2.2.3.2    Native Messaging 
The CPABE algorithm was implemented on the system, so we needed a way 
for the extension to communicate with the algorithm. Extensions and apps 
can exchange messages with native applications using an API that is similar 
to the other message passing APIs. Native applications that support this 
feature must register a native messaging host that knows how to 
communicate with the extension. Chrome starts the host in a separate 
process and communicates with it using standard input and standard output 
streams [10].  
 
 In order to register a native messaging host the application must install 
a manifest file that defines the native messaging host configuration. Figure 
2.2 is a manifest file that shows how the native messaging host configuration 












                              Figure 2.2     Extension – Manifest File II 
 
 
2.2.4 CPABE Toolkit 
The CPABE toolkit provides a set of programs implementing a ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption scheme. It uses the PBC library for the 
algebraic operations. The toolkit provides four command line tools used to 
perform the various operations of the scheme. They are designed for 
straightforward invocation by larger systems in addition to manual usage. The 




"Web server" can refer to hardware or software, or both of them working 
together. On the hardware side, a web server is a computer that stores a 
website's component files (e.g. HTML documents, images, CSS stylesheets, 
and JavaScript files) and delivers them to the end-user's device. It is 
 
{ 
  "name": "com.google.chrome.example.echo", 
  "description": "Chrome Native Messaging API 
Example Host", 
  "path": "HOST_PATH", 
  "type": "stdio", 
  "allowed_origins": [ 
    "chrome-
extension://knldjmfmopnpolahpmmgbagdohdnhkik/" 




connected to the Internet and can be accessed through a domain name. On 
the software side, a web server includes several parts that control how web 
user’s access hosted files, at minimum an HTTP server. An HTTP server is a 
piece of software that understands URLs (web addresses) and HTTP (the 
protocol your browser uses to view webpages). At the most basic level, 
whenever a browser needs a file hosted on a web server, the browser 
requests the file via HTTP. When the request reaches the correct web server 
(hardware), the HTTP server (software) sends the requested document back, 
also through HTTP. The webserver that is dealt with here is a static 
webserver. consists of a computer (hardware) with an HTTP server 
(software). We call it "static" because the server sends its hosted files "as-is" 





Figure 2.3    Webserver-Architecture 
 
 
2.3 Related Work 
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The foundation of the CPABE lies in attribute based encryption which can be 
thought as a predecessor of CPABE. The need for attribute based encryption 
aroused when there was a rapid increase in storing of sensitive user data on 
third party applications through the internet. This made user data highly 
vulnerable if the third party application was subjected to any kind of attack. 
One of the solutions to this problem was to store data on these third party 
applications in an encrypted format. One disadvantage of encrypting data is 
that it severely limits the ability of users to selectively share their encrypted 
data at a fine-grained level. Suppose a particular user wants to grant 
decryption access to a party to all of its Internet traffic logs for all entries on a 
particular range of dates that had a source IP address from a particular 
subnet. The user either needs to act as an intermediary and decrypt all 
relevant entries for the party or must give the party its private decryption key, 
and thus let it have access to all entries. Neither one of these options is 
particularly appealing [12]. 
 
 Sahai and Waters came up with a solution to this problem by 
introducing Attributed-Based Encryption (ABE). In an ABE system, the keys 
and cipher texts are labeled with a particular set of descriptive attributes. 
Decryption only occurs when the attributes of the key match with the cipher 
text [13]. Vipul Goyal, Omkant Pandey, Sahai and Waters came up with a 
richer approach where in each cipher text is labeled by the encryptor with a 
set of descriptive attributes. Each private key is associated with an access 




 Another paper that was critical while considering the implementation 
was “Decentralizing Attribute-Based Encryption” by Allison Lewko and Brent 
Waters. The paper proposed a multi authority based encryption scheme in 
which control does lies with one particular user but any user who has all the 
requirements at any given point of time. The major drawback of this simple 
engineered approach of ABE is that it requires a designated central authority 
[14]. This authority must be globally trustworthy, since its failure will 
compromise the entire system. If we aim to build a large or even global scale 
system, this authority will become a common bottleneck. Spreading a central 
authority’s keys over several machines to alleviate performance pressures 
might simultaneously increase the risk of key exposure. 
 
 Chase [15] came up with an interesting solution wherein she used the 
concept of using a global identifier as a “linchpin” for tying users’ keys 
together. Her system relied on a central authority and was limited to 
expressing a strict “AND” policy over a pre-determined set of authorities. 
Therefore a party encrypting would be much more limited than the existing 
ABE approach. Muller, Katzenbeisser, and Eckert [16, 17] give a different 
system with a centralized authority that realizes any LSSS access structure. 
 
 Allison Lewko and Brent Waters proposed a solution where a new 
multi-authority Attribute-Based Encryption system is in place. In this system 
any party could become the main authority and there was no need of any 
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global certification provided initial reference parameters were set. A party can 
simply act as an authority by creating a public key and issuing private keys to 
different users that reflect their attributes. Different authorities need not even 
be aware of each other. They used Chase [15] concept of global identifiers to 
“link” private keys together that were issued to the same user by different 
authorities. A user can encrypt data in terms of any boolean formula over 
attributes issued from any chosen set of authorities [14]. The lack of a central 
authority improves the overall performance of the system as every process 
does not need any validation of a central authority. The paper by Allison 
Lewko and Brent Waters was critical while considering the implementation of 
the extension as we also wanted to have an ideal situation where each user 
has the ability to share the encrypted message without the blessing of a 
centralized authority which would greatly reduce the latency present in the 
system. 
 
2.3.1 CPABE Overview 
The paper by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters is one of the founding papers 
for CPABE. The cpabe toolkit which was used as part of the extension was 
also built based on the conclusions of this paper [3].  Their system at a higher 
level consisted of a user’s private key being associated with an arbitrary 
number of attributes expressed as strings. Encryption of a message over a 
system requires parties to specify an access structure over a set of attributes. 
A user will only be able to decrypt a cipher text if that user’s attributes pass 
through the cipher text’s access structure. At a mathematical level, access 
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structures in our system are described by a monotonic “access tree”, where 
nodes of the access structure are composed of threshold gates and the 
leaves describe attributes. 
 
 The primary drawback of the Sahai-Waters [13] threshold ABE system 
is that the threshold semantics are not very expressive and therefore are 
limiting for designing more general systems [3].  Similarly the biggest 
drawback in Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KPABE) [12] was that 
encryptor exerts no choice on who has access to the data he encrypts except 
for the choice of what attributes he chooses to encrypt the data. He must put 
his trust in key issuer hoping that he does not distribute the wrong key. In 
other words, the “intelligence” is assumed to be with the key issuer, and not 
the encryptor. In CPABE, the encryptor must be able to intelligently decide 
who should or should not have access to the data that he encrypts [3]. 
 
 Another significant milestone when dealing with CPABE is its ability to 
fend off collusion attacks. If multiple users collude, they should only be able to 
decrypt a cipher text if at least one of the users could decrypt it on their own. 
A conventional approach to mitigate this problem was achieved by using a 
secret-sharing scheme and embedding independently chosen secret shares 
into each private key. Because of the independence of the randomness used 
in each invocation of the secret sharing scheme, collusion-resistance followed 
[13]. In the paper proposed by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters a novel private 
key randomization technique that uses a new two-level random masking 
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methodology. This methodology makes use of groups with efficiently 
computable bilinear maps [3].  
 
2.3.2 CPABE Model Construction 
A cipher text-policy attribute based encryption scheme consists of four 
fundamental algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt. In addition, 
the implementation allows for the option of a fifth algorithm Delegate [3]. 
Shown below is the five stage algorithm: 
Setup: The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit security 
parameter. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK. 
 
Encrypt(PK, M, A): The encryption algorithm takes as input the public 
parameters PK, a message M, and an access structure A over the universe of 
attributes. The algorithm will encrypt M and produce a cipher text CT such 
that only a user that possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the access 
structure will be able to decrypt the message. We will assume that the cipher 
text implicitly contains A. 
 
Key Generation(MK, S): The key generation algorithm takes as input the 
master key MK and a set of attributes S that describe the key. It outputs a 
private key SK. 
 
Decrypt(PK, CT, SK): The decryption algorithm takes as input the public 
parameters PK, a cipher text CT, which contains an access policy A, and a 
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private key SK, which is a private key for a set S of attributes. If the set S of 
attributes satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the 
cipher text and return a message M. 
 
Delegate(SK, P). The delegate algorithm takes as input a secret key SK for 
some set of attributes S and a set P ⊆ S. It output a secret key for the set 
of attributes P. 
 
The CPABE toolkit was built on the model construction shown above. 
Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters have an in-depth mathematical proof on the 
validity of the process however a discussion on that is beyond the scope of 
this report. 
 
2.3.3 Similar Approaches  
The paper “Persona: An Online Social Network with User-Defined Privacy” 
had a very interesting approach with regard to policy based encryption. In 
their model each user generated an asymmetric key pair and distributes the 
public key to other users whom he wishes to share the information with. The 
model allows users to choose groups and share information to members of 
that group. Users control access to personal data by encrypting to “groups.” 
Restricting data to specific groups allows users to have fine-grained control 
over access policy, which permits exchanging data with more restrictions. 
Groups created by one user do not affect the groups that can be created by 
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another [2]. A very similar approach was used when designing the 
architecture of the extension.  
 
 Another paper that is closely related to this discussion is the paper by 
Jahid, Mittal and Borisov. They came up with a novel way to prevent 
information leakage during policy based encryption. The architecture design 
of their system would prevent information leakage in a dynamic group. The 
use this by using a minimally trusted proxy. The basic idea is, a social contact 
who wants to decrypt a data, takes a part of the cipher text (CT) to the proxy. 
The proxy uses its key to transform CT into such a form that contains enough 
information that an unrevoked user can combine with his secret key 
mathematically, and successfully perform decryption, whereas a revoked user 
cannot do so. Upon each key revocation, the user rekeys her proxy with the 
latest revocation information. The biggest disadvantage in this architecture is 
that is the possible latency delay while the user tries to communicate with the 
proxy. The other issue here is that proxy needs to be a trusted source and 
should not be subjected an attack [19].  
 
 To conclude our background research we look into the paper by Lee, 
Chung and Hwang. The paper talks about the attribute based encryption 
models with access control schemes over the cloud. The paper judges the 
encryption scheme on six criterion namely fine-grained access control, data 
confidentiality, scalability, user accountability, user revocation, and collusion 
resistant. The paper indicates that CPABE all of the above criterion except 
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scalability i.e. ability of the system to work efficiently when number of 
authorized users increases. The extension that was developed mitigates this 
issue as it gives each user at any given point of time complete autonomy on 
sending encrypted data to its user group i.e. it is not dependent on an 
external cloud server for validating the authenticity. This greatly improves the 


































3.1 Problem Definition 
We want to develop a mechanism for encrypting and decrypting data on 
Twitter such that only the intended users are able to see the data. We also 
have to ensure that the entire system is decentralized such that every user is 
granted atomicity with regard to whom he wishes to share the data with. The 
system implemented must be scalable i.e. not falter if the number of users 
wishing to encrypt increases. Care should be taken to minimize the latency in 




The problem definition posted many unique challenges which are listed below. 
 
3.2.1 What encryption mechanism must be used? 
This challenge was probably the most fundamental challenge while trying to 
come up with a solution for the problem statement. So we needed to choose 
an encryption mechanism. The problem statement states that the information 
flow is from many to many, i.e. every user decides who he wishes to send the 
data to. Conventional private key, public key cryptography can be completely 
ruled out as key management becomes extremely messy. Let us take an 
example to illustrate this say Jake wishes to share some information via a 
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tweet to Alice, Cathy and Bob. Jake would have to encrypt the message 
separately with Bob’s public key, Alice’s public key and Cathy’s public key. 
Moreover he has to retweet the same information three times after encrypting 
the information with each of their public keys. Jake will also be responsible for 
the distribution of the private keys initially. If Jake wishes to send a sensitive 
tweet to N users he would be managing roughly 2N keys such a scenario is 
clearly undesirable.   
 
 Another encryption mechanism that was considered was symmetric 
key encryption. In symmetric key encryption Jake would encrypt the tweet 
with a key and send the same key to Alice, Cathy and Bob who would use the 
key to decrypt the encrypted text. The biggest issue here is that Jake has no 
way to revoke the key. Assuming that Jake initially sends a the encrypted 
tweet and symmetric key to Alice, Cathy and Bob but for the next tweet he 
only wishes to send it to Bob, Alice and Cathy can still decrypt this tweet as 
Jake cannot revoke their keys. After performing these analyses we realized 
that classical cryptographic approaches may not be ideal for this problem. 
 
 The next obvious choice was to shift to attribute based encryption. 
ABE despite many glowing advantages needed a middleman for i.e. a 
designated central authority for all authentications. Apart from this ABE did 
not offer fine-grained access control and ability to revoke users i.e. remove 
their key privileges [20]. Keeping these aspects in mind ABE was not 




 After lot of deliberation CPABE was chosen as the encryption 
mechanism for solving the problem. CPABE had many advantages namely 
fine-grained access control, data confidentiality, user accountability, user 
revocation, and collusion resistance [20]. These advantages made us favor 
CPABE. The only disadvantage with CPABE is that it is not very scalable. 
However with carefully designing our system in a particular manner that is 
described below we can circumvent the problem.  
   
3.2.2 How should the system be designed? 
This was the next stage of the problem, we needed a system which requires 
minimum user effort while encrypting and decrypting tweets. An average user  
needs you to use the system without really understanding the process behind 
it. Moreover the user should not go outside the comfort of his workstation to 
retrieve any decrypted text or send an encrypted text i.e. no call should be 
made to any central authority. This is an understandable design constraint as 
no user would like to leave the comfort of his domain to retrieve information 
for he may feel that the location he or she is routed to might be subjected to 
an attack of some sorts. Another design paradigm that was imposed was that 
the system should be extremely light weight on the users system. The idea 
behind this being users want to access tools which are convenient to use and 




 Keeping all these constraints in mind the research group decided to go 
with a chrome extension to be the interface that carries out the encryption and 
decryption process. Chrome extensions are essentially plugins that are run on 
the client side browser. Extensions are easy to use for the user and as it is 
run on the browser extremely light on the users system. Another advantage 
with extensions is that it is extremely interactive, the user has to click buttons 
rather than type commands to carry out the encryption and decryption 
process. The content scripts present in the chrome extension have an 
advantage with regard to storing the decrypted tweet which we will see later. 
The biggest advantage in my opinion of what the extension offers is that it 
runs on the browser. Our focus here is to send encrypted information through 
Twitter. It would be extremely laborious for the user if the system that does 
the same is stored in some other location of the user’s host. 
 
3.2.3 How to tweet encrypted messages? 
The next challenge after we decided to use an extension was how do to tweet 
the encrypted message. This problem posed two unique challenges. The first 
challenge was we wanted to tweet the encrypted text in Twitter in such a way 
that any unwanted third party who is viewing the users profile cannot make 
out whether the tweet is encrypted or not. The second challenge was to 
minimize the size of the encrypted text. Twitter has a 140 character restriction 
with regard to the length of a tweet. All encrypted texts which even have 
singular policies result in encrypted texts of over 140 characters. Another 
trivial problem was that the encrypted text was in Unicode which Twitter does 
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not support, so the encrypted text needs to be converted to some other 
format before tweeting. 
 
 A basic solution that was suggested was to use some kind of encoding 
mechanism to encode the encrypted text and then tweet the encoded 
encrypted text. Base91 was considered for the encoding. Base91 is an 
advanced method for encoding binary data as ASCII characters. It is similar 
to Base64, but is more efficient. The overhead produced by Base91 depends 
on the input data. It amounts at most to 23% (versus 33% for base64) and 
can range down to 14%, which typically occurs on 0-byte blocks [21]. So we 
encoded the encrypted text with Base91. This resulted in texts ranging from 
720-2000 characters. So if we had to tweet the encoded text we would  
roughly need a minimum of 6 tweets. Apart from this while decrypting we 
would have combine these tweets together to decrypt them. There are lot of 
flaws in this process, first and foremost 6 arbitrary tweets in a weird format 
with definitely attract the attention of account eavesdroppers who would begin 
to get curious with what is being conveyed. Another issue which arises is that 
encrypted text usually is an arbitrary format with large amount of spaces. 
Using multiple tweets can corrupt the original format of the encrypted text 
making it impossible to decrypt. Factoring all these inferences the first 
approach was rejected. 
 
 The next approach that was considered was reducing the size of the 
encoded text to 140 characters by running various compression algorithms 
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and then rephrasing the resultant text into something more meaningful. The 
smallest size of the encoded tweet is 720 characters, if that has to be 
converted to 140 characters you need a compression algorithm that runs at 6: 
1 ratio. Though there are many powerful compression algorithms they usually 
work well for structured text data, the encrypted text is unstructured and 
arbitrary which is what we actually want it to be as random as possible. When 
we ran various compression algorithms which are suggested in [22] [23] the 
results obtained were not what was expected. Other popular techniques such 
as gzip were also implemented but the results obtained were not satisfactory. 
 
 Based on the results of the previous attempts we decided to take 
advantage of hiding the encrypted text in images. An image is essentially a  
matrix with each pixel corresponding to a particular intensity value. We know 
any text on the computer is essentially a binary number represented as a 
character encoding set. What we decided to do was to convert the encrypted 
text to a binary format and then add to the image matrix. Adding binary values 
to various pixels would not change its value by much as only 1’s and 0’s are 
added. Twitter gives as an option of tweeting media where we can tweet the 
image containing the encrypted text. This solution solves both of our 
problems the encrypted text is well hidden preventing eavesdroppers from 
realizing that the user has sent an encrypted text. Hiding the encrypted text in 
an image also means that we do not need to worry about 140 character limit 
present in Twitter. What is even better is that we can encrypt plain text over 
140 characters and still send it via Twitter if the above mechanism is used. 
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Under normal circumstances it would be impossible to send a tweet that is 
over 140 characters.  
 
3.2.4 How to distribute Keys? 
We had to come up with a simple mechanism where in the user does not 
have to manage multiple keys. Also keys need not be generated multiple 
times if the sender is communicating with the same user group. 
 
 The solution to this problem was that the sender creates private keys 
for the users he wishes to shares the information with and sends the private  
keys to them via Twitter private messaging. After this the extension while 
trying to decrypt private messages uses the key present in the receiver’s 
message inbox. The sender can easily revoke the key by including something 
like a timestamp in his policy while encrypting the text. If this timestamp 
defers from the one in the receiver’s private key then it can be said that 
particular key of the receiver is not valid and is revoked. Since private 
messaging in Twitter is encrypted there is no fear of information leakage. 
Another advantage of using Twitter messaging system is that there is no need 
of any separate of key management system and all the decryption work can 
happen on the browser at the extension level. 
 
 
3.2.5 How to display the decrypted text? 
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After the encrypted text is retrieved form the image and decrypted with the 
help of private key the resulting text still needs to be displayed. Storing the 
decrypted text on the users system is not ideal as there is a possibility of 
multiple users using the same computer and these users while accessing the 
computer can look at the user’s decrypted text. Another issue is that from a 
user interface perspective the user would like to see the decrypted text on top 
of the image which had the encrypted text. This is desired because it makes 
life easier for the user. 
 
The solution to this problem was achieved by using content script 
present in the extension. Content scripts give the user the ability to change 
the HTML page present in the browser locally. What we did was we made the 
extension’s content script pull the decrypted text from the system and display 
it on top of the intended image in Twitter. By doing this we ensured that no 
local copy of the decrypted text is maintained and also the user knows what 
images in Twitter have information that was intended for him. This also 
improves user experience. Another interesting aspect about content scripts is 
that because all actions by the script will always have a local consequence 
the actual image posted by the sender does not undergo any undesired 
change. This is also a desired trait as we don’t the receiver to post the 



















Figure 4.1.A and 4.1.B gives the overview of our solution. Shown below is 
the architectural flow of our system design which is represented by the two 
figures. In the following discussion we will have an in-depth of each component 
in the system.  
 
 




   
Figure 4.1.B Decryption Algorithm overview 
 
In the following paragraphs we are going to give a quick overview of the 
encryption and decryption process. The encryption process begins with the 
user logging into Twitter which is shown in step a in figure 4.1.A. After doing 
this the user sends the plain text he wishes to encrypt along with a policy of 
his liking as indicated by step-b.  The extension after step b is complete 
establishes connection with the native messaging host to carry out the 
encryption process which is indicated by step c. The native messaging host 
then encrypts the user’s plain text along with the policy with the help of 
CPABE encryption as indicated in step d. The encrypted text is then encoded 
into an image as indicated in step e. The encoded image is then posted on 





The decryption process overview is indicated in figure 4.1.B. Initially the 
user has to enter his credentials to the extension to validate he is the desired 
user for the decryption process as indicated in step a. This is done to 
guarantee that only the intended user decrypts the message. The user then 
logs in to his or her Twitter account via the browser as indicated in step b and 
step c. The extension then establishes connection with the native messaging 
host as indicated in step d. The native messaging host then downloads all 
images from the users Twitter feed which may be possible encrypted images 
as indicated in step e. The images then are decoded to extract the encrypted 
text as indicated in step f. After this CPABE decryption happens as indicated 
in step g. The results of the decryption are sent to the extension via the native 
messaging host as indicated in step h and step i. The extension then posts 
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4.2 Chrome Extension Encryption Architecture 
 
 
4.2.1 User interface - Encryption Process  
Shown below in Figure 4.2 is the pop up that appears when the user clicks 
the chrome extension. The chrome extension consists of a simple pop up 
HTML which pop’s up upon clicking the extension. The pop up HTML in 
essence is the primary and the only user interface when the user wishes to 
interact with the extension. The popup HTML also has the background 
JavaScript present it which does all other actions intended for the extension.  
 
 
   
                                                  Figure 4.2.  Chrome Extension  
 
 
The initial HTML popup gives the user two choices one is sending an 
encrypted text i.e. sending a message via Twitter and the other is decrypting 
the existing messages. We will discuss both these mechanisms in depth in 
this chapter. 
 
            Upon clicking the encrypt button the screen changes to what is show 
in Figure 4.3. The interface comprises of three users who the sender can 
send the information to. The users are Alice, Bob and Cathy. Though ideally 
the user would like to share this information with a circle of friends we have 
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simplified this to three people for a better user experience. Following that is a 
textbox where the user can enter the text he wishes to encrypt. Whoever the 
users chooses for the checkbox are the users who can decrypt the encrypted 
message. The page also has two buttons, the encrypt button which encrypts 
the text based on the attributes (check box values) and the upload button 
which uploads the encrypted image to Twitter. There are JavaScripts that run 
in the background that help us achieve the same. We will talk about this in 
detail in the following paragraphs.  
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4.2.2 JavaScript – Encryption Process   
Once the user hits the encrypt button what actually happens is that the 
background JavaScript file which is part of the extension is called. What must 
be observed is that the encryption and decryption algorithm is present in our 
local host as we make advantage of the CPABE toolkit. JavaScript is a client 
side tool, which can only run on the browser. It is impossible for JavaScript to 
access any program on a local host. To circumvent this problem we have 
taken advantage of native messaging feature present in chrome extension. 
 
     Chrome starts each native messaging host in a separate process and 
communicates with it using standard input (stdin) and standard output 
(stdout). The same format is used to send messages in both directions: each 
message is serialized using JSON, UTF-8 encoded and is preceded with 32-
bit message length in native byte order. The maximum size of a single 
message from the native messaging host is 1 MB, mainly to protect Chrome 
from misbehaving native applications. The maximum size of the message 
sent to the native messaging host is 4 GB [10]. 
 
       When a messaging port is created using runtime.connectNative Chrome 
starts native messaging host process and keeps it running until the port is 
destroyed. When a message is sent usingruntime.sendNativeMessage, 
without creating a messaging port, Chrome starts a new native messaging 
host process for each message. In that case the first message generated by 
the host process is handled as a response to the original request, then 
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whenruntime.sendNativeMessage is called. All other messages generated by 
the native messaging host in that case are ignored [10]. 
 
    Sending and receiving messages to and from a native application is very 
similar to cross-extension messaging. The main difference is 
that runtime.connectNative is used instead of runtime.connect, and 
runtime.sendNativeMessage is used instead of runtime.sendMessage. These 
methods can only be used if the "nativeMessaging" permission is declared in 
the extension's manifest file [10]. 
 
 What happens upon clicking the encrypt button is that it initially calls 
the background.js which in turn  downloads the value present in the check 
boxes and also the text that needs to be encrypted and stores it locally on the 
local host as a text file. Upon clicking the upload button the encrypted text 
that is present in the image is uploaded onto Twitter.  
 
4.2.3 Native Messaging Host – Encryption Process    
Upon clicking the upload button background.js makes a call to the native 
messaging host manifest file. The native messaging host manifest file is 
already preinstalled onto the local host. The manifest file essentially sets the 
permissions to what programs or script the extension can have access to. 
The native messaging manifest file points to a bash script. This script reads 




4.2.3.1 CPABE Encryption – Encryption Process   
After the bashscript reads these files it encrypts the text that needs to be 
encrypted based on the checkbox values. To do this the bashscript calls the 
CPABE toolkit that is present and then passes the checkbox values present 
as parameters and encrypts the text file. The resultant text is then stored as 

















                                 Figure 4.4 Encrypted Text 
 
4.2.3.2 Base91 Encoding – Encryption Process                 
 The bashscript then encodes the encrypted text with Base91. The encrypted 
text is originally in unicode and a lot of systems cannot process unicode due 
to previous user settings. To simplify matters we converted unicode into a 
more readable form with the help of Base91. Base91 was chosen because it 
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had a fairly good compression ate when compared to other encoding 
schemes i.e. in does not make the resultant text too long. 
 
4.2.4 Image Encoding – Encryption Process                 
The encoded text then needed to be appended to an image. To achieve this 
python was used. An image was selected by the extension and the image 
was converted into a binary matrix form with the help of python. Upon 
achieving this the encrypted text was also converted to a binary format. The 
encrypted text was then added to the existing image matrix. Upon doing this a 
binary tag was added to the end of the image to indicate that it is an 
encrypted image. Shown below in Figure 4.5 are code snippets for the same. 
 
 
       
 
 
        
 








                        Figure 4.5 Image Encryption 
 
binary = str2bin(message) + binary tag 
img = Image.open(filename) 
img_matrix = img.getdata() 
for item in img_matrix: 
   if (digit < len(binary)): 
      newpix = 
encode(rgb2hex(item[0],item[1],item[2]),binar
y[digit]) 
      if newpix == None: 
         newData.append(item) 
      else: 
         r, g, b = hex2rgb(newpix) 
         newData.append((r,g,b,255)) 
         digit += 1 
   else: 









4.2.4 Image Upload – Encryption Process                 
Once the image is encrypted the next stage of the process is to post the 
encrypted text to Twitter. To do this we utilize Tweepy. A python script was 
used which uses the senders credentials to post the image onto Twitter. After 
this is achieved the cached data such as the original plain text and the sender 
list are removed from the local host. Shown below in Figure 4.6 is a code 
snippet of the upload process. 
 
          
Figure 4.6 Image Upload   
      





CONSUMER_KEY = '****************************' 
CONSUMER_SECRET = '****************************' 
ACCESS_KEY = ****************************' 
ACCESS_SECRET = '****************************' 
 
auth = tweepy.OAuthHandler(CONSUMER_KEY, CONSUMER_SECRET) 




# access the Twitter API using tweepy with OAuth 
 













Figure 4.7 shows the overall flow of the encryption part of the extension which includes 
all the processes that are carried out by the bashscript that talks to the native 
messaging host. 
                                                      
                                                   Figure 4.7 Program flow  






#check if the input file exists 
if [ -f "$FILE" ]; 
then 
   echo "File $FILE exist." 
   cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/ 
   mkdir ola 
   cp input.txt /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe 
   cp attributes.txt /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe 
   # removing cached file 
   rm input.txt  
   rm attributes.txt 
   cd /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe  
   # run a shell file that runs the encryption algorithm 
   python shell_run.py 
   cp input.txt.cpabe /home/anirudh/Downloads/base91-0.6.0-
linux-i386/bin  
   # encode the encrypted text 
   cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/base91-0.6.0-linux-i386/bin 
   ./base91 -o encrypt.txt input.txt.cpabe 
   cp encrypt.txt /home/anirudh/Downloads/host 
   rm encrypt.txt 
   python --version 
   cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/host 
   cp /home/anirudh/Downloads/image/test.png 
/home/anirudh/Downloads/host 
   /usr/bin/python2.7 ./hide.py -e test.png 
   python –version 
  # upload the tweet 
   /usr/bin/python3.4 ./update.py 
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4.3 Chrome Extension Decryption Architecture 
 
 
4.3.1 User interface - Decryption Process  
The next aspect of the extension process we are going to deal with is the decryption 
process. The user clicks the decrypt button present in the popup HTML. Upon hitting the 
decrypt button a screen similar to the one in Figure 4.8 shows up. The page requires 
you to enter your Twitter credentials so that your private key can be recovered from 
your messages. The idea of this extra authentication is to guarantee that only the 
intended user has access to the private key.  
 
                                               Figure 4.8 Decryption User Interface 
 
 
4.3.2 Content Script - Decryption Process  
After this is achieved all the images in the users Twitter page are downloaded. This is 
done through the content script. The content script has a function which basically crawls 
through the page and returns all possible encrypted image candidates. This then is 
stored in the form a text file on the local host. The text file is basically contains the links 
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of all the images on the users Twitter feed. Figure 4.9 shows a code snippet of the 
same. The script works as a scroll down function i.e. when the user scrolls down. 
 
 












                               
 
 
                                                      Figure 4.9 Image Download Links 
 
 
After this is achieved the next stage is when our content script calls the native 






var s = ""; 
var count = 0; 
$('.stream').find('img').each(function( index ) { 
  if(count < 10 && 
$(this).attr('src').indexOf('media') > -1 && 
$(this).attr('src').indexOf('pbs') > -1 && 
$(this).attr('src').indexOf('.png') > -1){ 
 s += $(this).attr('src') + '\n'; 




var textFileAsBlob = new Blob([s], 
{type:'text/plain'}); 
var fileNameToSaveAs = "images.txt"; 
var downloadLink = document.createElement("a"); 
downloadLink.download = fileNameToSaveAs; 






4.3.3 Native Messaging Host - Decryption Process  
The method chrome.runtime.sendMessage sends a single message to event listeners 
within your extension/app or a different extension/app. Similar to runtime.connect but 
only sends a single message, with an optional response. If sending to your extension, 
the runtime.onMessage event will be fired in each page, or runtime.onMessageExternal, 
if a different extension. The extensions cannot send messages to content scripts using 
this method.  
 
We use chrome.runtime.sendMessage to make an asynchronous call with the 
background.js file. The background.js file calls the bashscript that does the decryption 
process for all the images. Figure 4.10 show the same. 
 
 
                                                           Figure 4.10 chrome.runtime.sendMessage         
 
     
# In the content script 
chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ 




# In the background script 
chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(function (msg, sender) { 
//alert('Reached here 1'); 
//alert(msg.from); 
//alert(msg.subject); 
// First, validate the message's structure 
if ((msg.from === 'content') && (msg.subject === 'showPageAction')) { 
// Enable the page-action for the requesting tab 
 
//chrome.pageAction.show(sender.tab.id); 







Once the native messaging bashscript is called by background.js. It downloads 
all the images of the users Twitter feed. Figure 4.11 is a code snippet for the same. 
 
 













Figure 4.11 Image download 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Image Decoding- Decryption Process  
Once the images are downloaded we need to extract the encoded text present in them. 
What we do is check if every downloaded image has the binary tag that was put in it by 
the sender. If the binary tag is present then we download the binary contents of the 
image and convert to a more readable form like ascii. Figure 4.12 shows a code snippet 




file = open('images.txt', 'r') 
count = 0 
for line in file: 
        m = str(count) 
        filename = line[28:47] 
        print(filename) 
 urllib.urlretrieve(line, 
"/home/anirudh/Downloads/img/"+filename) 






                                                          Figure 4.12 Retrieve Encrypted Text script 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Image Decryption- Decryption Process  
Once decoding is accomplished what is left is to try and decrypt the encrypted text. To 
do this the bashscript that talks to the extension retrieves the encrypted text from all the 
images it then tries to decrypt these images with the help of the private key it has 
downloaded. Figure 4.13 is a code snippet that shows the same. It is important to note 
that decryption in our case is a two way process which comprises of decoding 
converting to Unicode from base91 and then decryption. 
def retr(filename): 
 img = Image.open(filename) 
 binary = '' 
 
 if img.mode in ('RGBA'): 
  img = img.convert('RGBA') 
  datas = img.getdata() 
 
  for item in datas: 
   digit = decode(rgb2hex(item[0],item[1],item[2])) 
   if digit == None: 
    pass 
   else: 
    binary = binary + digit 
    if (binary[-16:] == binary tag): 
     with open('output.txt', 'wb') as filer: 
      filer.write(bin2str(binary[:-16])) 
     return bin2str(binary[:-16]) 
 
  return bin2str(binary) 




            
                                          Figure 4.13 Decryption Process 
 
4.3.4 Image mapping - Decryption Process  
After decryption is done we need to group the right decrypted text with the correct 
image this is done by creating a JSON file where each image is mapped to the 




cp user_login.txt /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe 
cp images.txt /home/anirudh/Downloads/host/ 
rm images.txt  
rm user_login.txt 
cd /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe 






count = 0  
# Retrieves the encrypted text from the images 
for file in /home/anirudh/Downloads/img/*.png 
do 
    alias python='/usr/bin/python2.7' 
    #echo $m 
    /usr/bin/python2.7  retreive.py -d $file 
    #/usr/bin/python2.7 ola.py -d Cf4ciQKWQAA7bv1.png  
done    
cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/texter/ 
for txt in /home/anirudh/Downloads/texter/*.txt 
do  
              #decrypts the encrypted text 
 myfile=$(basename $txt) 
 echo $myfile 
 #echo ${txt:28} 
 cp $txt /home/anirudh/Downloads/base91-0.6.0-linux-i386/bin 
 cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/base91-0.6.0-linux-i386/bin 
 ./base91 -d -o result.cpabe $txt 
 cp result.cpabe /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe  
 cd /home/anirudh/CPABE/cpabe 
 ./cpabe-dec pub_key priv_key_Twitter result.cpabe 
 cp result /home/anirudh/Downloads/texter/ 
        rm result 
        rm result.cpabe 
 cd /home/anirudh/Downloads/texter/ 
        rm $txt 















                                   
 
 
  Figure 4.14 Decrypted text in JSON Format 
 
4.3.5 Displaying Results - Decryption Process  
After mapping is completed now it is a question of our how do we display back this 
result to the Twitter page, to do this we use the help of the content script again. Before 
that we create a local webserver to location of our results. This is done by creating a 
local HTPPS server. The code snippet for the server is shown in Figure 4.15. 
import glob, os,json 
os.chdir("/home/anirudh/Downloads/texter
/") 
dict = {} 
# Get all the encrypted text 
for file in glob.glob("*.txt"): 
    m = file[0:15] 
    print(m) 
    first_line = '' 
    with open(file, 'r') as f: 
        first_line = f.readline() 
    print(first_line) 
    dict[m] = first_line 
print(dict) 
#Map image with decrypted text 
with open('data.json', 'w') as fp: 













     
 
Figure 4.15 HTTPS Server  
 
The content script then makes an AJAX call to server retrieves the decrypted texts and 






















              
                     

















# Displays the respective text on top of the decrypted 
images 
Display_text = function(){ 
$.ajax({ 
   url : "https://localhost:4443/data.json", 
   type : "GET", 
   success : function(result){ 
  //console.log(result.Cf5rW8yW4AAju4P); 
  $.each(result, function(i,j){ 
 
 $('.stream').find('img').each(function(index){ 
   if($(this).attr('src').indexOf(i) > -1){ 
    $(this).before(j); 
   } 
  }); 
  }); 







In Figure 4.17 we show an example of the same where the user @twitertest23 tweets a 
set of encrypted images. He then distributes the private keys to Cathy and Bob. When 
Cathy and Bob try to decrypt the images they can only see those images which there 
private key can decrypt in other words decryption occurs only if the policy in the 
encrypted text matches the key. 
 



















                                  
                                            






                                  
Figure 4.17 shows the decryption process for two users Cathy and Bob. The user has 
encrypted the images in such a way that the first image only Alice and Cathy while the 
second image only Alice and Bob can see. The top images on the left hand side of 
Figure 4.16 show Alice and Bob’s Twitter feed before decryption while the ones on the 
right so their respective Twitter feeds after decryption. Observe that Cathy is only able 




























In the following chapter we are going to discuss the results and the performance of the 
chrome extension. The chrome extension was able to encrypt and decrypt messages 
with CPABE as the encryption protocol in a fairly efficient manner. The extension is very 
scalable and can be implemented across multiple systems without any user gaining 
complete authority. This was tested out by implementing the system across various 
systems. As every single user is given complete authority during the encryption and 
decryption process and all the process are done locally at a browser level it is not 
possible for any user or external system to gain control at any point of time. 
  
 The idea of using a chrome extension worked to our advantage. The extension 
was easy to use for the user and as it is run on the browser it did not consume may 
system resources. Another advantage with our extension was that it is extremely 
interactive, the user had to click buttons rather than type commands to carry out the 
encryption and decryption process. The easy of usability is a critical factor while trying 
design an encryption platform for an OSN like Twitter. 
 
 The use of images rather than text in the tweet gave us an advantage with regard 
to time complexity. Though traditionally image processing is slower than text processing 
when we deal with encryption it yields better result. When we deal with encrypted text 
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the tweet limit becomes a serious issue, as Twitter allows only a 140 character limit for 
any tweet. This would have led us to have close to 6 tweets even for very small 
encrypted messages. The time taken to group these encrypted tweets would be 
extremely large, given that encrypted texts have random spacing, moreover even while 
grouping these encrypted texts lot of things can go wrong which would result in the 
decryption algorithm breaking, this is highly undesirable so the shift towards an image 
based encryption approach worked in our favor. 
  
 Another aspect that was a success with regard to the extension was key 
distribution. The sender creating the private keys for the users he wishes to share the 
information with and then distributing the private keys via Twitter private messaging 
resulted in no need of any separate of key management system and all the decryption 
work can happen on the browser at the extension level. After this the extension while 
trying to decrypt private messages used the key present in the receiver’s message 
inbox. The sender was easily able to revoke the key by including something like a 
timestamp in his policy while encrypting the text. The timestamp deferring from the one 
in the receiver’s private key resulted in the key being revoked. Since private messaging 
in Twitter is encrypted no additional encryption was needed.  Ideally in a plugin the 
policy would be entered in a textbox rather than checkboxes. But we have included 
textboxes for easy of usability. This implies that the user should include the timestamp 
in as part of the plain text that needs to be encrypted. The plugin initially does a quick 
comparison of the timestamp with the existing timestamp of the user’s private key and 
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they match then the decryption process begins. This variation of the implementation 
was carried out for ease of user usability.  
 
 Another advantage with the system implemented is that it cannot have encoding 
issues. All texts after encryption are encoded to Base91, this guarantees that any 
system would be able to pick the encrypted text and read it. Otherwise what might have 
happen is certain systems might only support certain type of encoding this regarding 
other types. This reduces any conflict in case the user has set the default encoding to a 
particular format.  
 
 Storing the decrypted text on the users system is not ideal as there is a 
possibility of multiple users using the same computer and these users while accessing 
the computer can look at the user’s decrypted text. The extension ensures that this 
does not take place by using the help of content scripts. As discussed earlier in the 
previous chapter what the extension does is that it decrypts the text for a group of 
images which it downloads from the user Twitter feed. It then creates JSON file with the 
image and decrypted text as the corresponding key value pair. After that the content 
script makes an AJAX call with the localhost and pulls data from the JSON file. It then 
does a one to one mapping where the decrypted text if it exist is placed on top of the 
image which had its original encrypted text. To make sure that the AJAX call is not 
made before all the images are decrypted we introduce a delay in the content script 
before the AJAX call is made. This delay is essentially the time taken by the extension 
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to carry out the decryption. The AJAX call is made when the user scrolls down his 
Twitter page. 
 
 Figure 5.1 is a graph that shows the encryption and decryption process based on 
the number of images crawled from the users Twitter feed. The time taken for the 
encryption and decryption process will obviously change also based on the size of the 
plaint text that is encrypted. Images that have the binary tag will not be decrypted as far 
as the plugin is considered they are plain images, but however these images will still be 
downloaded. 
  
                                      Figure 5.1 Encryption Time vs Number of Images 
 
 We observe that the encryption time linearly increases if the extension has to 






























DecryptionTime vs Number of Images
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image is nearly a constant, and so if the number of images increases we expect a linear 
increase in encryption time. 
 
 Another interesting capability of the extension is that now using it we can send 
text of over 140 characters via Twitter. For very large amount of characters the size of 
the image needs to be increased so that it can handle the additional textual data. Figure 
5.2 and Figure 5.3 shows the time taken to encrypt the plain text and the time taken to 
append the encrypted text to an image for plain texts of various sizes. 
 
 






























                                                   Figure 5.3 Image Encryption Time vs Plain Text Size 
 
 As we can see from Figures 5.2 and 5.3 the encryption time and the image 
encryption time increase if the size of the plain text increases. It nearly is a constant for 
plain texts of a particular size but as the size of the plain text increases to larger values 
the encryption time of image as well as the plain text increases. This is what is expected 
as the encrypted text size increase more columns in the image matrix need to be 
accessed this increase the encryption time of the image. With regard to the encryption 








































Conclusion and Future Work 
 
We were able to develop a mechanism for encrypting and decrypting data on Twitter in 
a way that only the intended users is able to see the data. Each user is granted 
complete atomicity with whom he wishes to share the data. The system implemented is 
scalable.  
We have also taken care to minimize the latency in the system so from a user’s 
perspective things look nearly spontaneous. The biggest take away from the system 
design is that most of the work of the system design is carried out by the browser 
extension. Novice users who have no prior knowledge with command line interfaces 
and other command line technologies only need to use the extension for encryption and 
decryption. Most of the conditions of our problem statement were met by implementing 
a thorough architectural design.  
 
 To make this project more complete in the future what a user can do is try to 
implement the CPABE toolkit in JavaScript rather than using its current form as a C 
based application. By doing this we can bring down latency to nearly zero seconds as 
all process will be carried out by the browser. Another extension that can be added to 
the application is to give the user an option by which he can send the encrypted image 
to a group of users of a particular type rather than selected users. By this what we mean 
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is the user has the ability to send it to all people working in his company rather than 
handpicking the users via the checkbox. Another extension can be that once an image 
has been decrypted the plugin can prevent the user from performing any other action on 
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